Phase Two Proceedings, Part 3.1
In part 3 of our current series on the MPSC, we told you a little about the career background of Theresa Sheets, the Administrative Law Judge appointed to oversee Enbridge’s phase two application. While we think that background is notable– after all, it’s not unlikely that one’s professional experiences might, inevitably, condition the way one thinks about certain matters– we never really set out to dwell on that point. We did, however, set out to dwell on the way (in our view) that Judge Sheets has done Enbridge’s bidding. In fact, we left off that post with this statement:
Enbridge attorneys have labored to limit the scope of the MPSC’s authority so severely as to cripple it– and Judge Sheets has helped them succeed.
Let us explain. If you’ve been paying attention to last week’s news about the MPSC’s approval of phase two, you may have noticed the following statement, found in the MPSC press release announcing the decision:
In approving the company’s application, the MPSC said the pipeline will serve a public need, is designed and routed in a reasonable manner, and meets or exceeds current safety and engineering standards.
Now these three simple criteria– presumably the basis upon which the MPSC made its decision– might at first glance appear to be benign and even reasonable. But the scary fact is that they are anything but benign. This framework has been, in the hands of Enbridge attorneys, a cudgel– a cudgel with which Enbridge has beaten the MPSC, Judge Sheets, and Michigan law into submission.
You see, the MPSC’s regulatory authority derives from a 1929 Michigan law known as Act 16 (we discussed this briefly in part one of this series, but regret that we were a little imprecise on this point at the time). This act describes the powers granted to the MPSC:
There is hereby granted to and vested in the Michigan public utilities commission, hereinafter styled the “commission,” the power to control, investigate and regulate every corporation, association or person, now or hereafter exercising or claiming the right to carry or transport crude oil or petroleum, or any of the products thereof, by or through pipe line or lines, for hire, compensation or otherwise, or now or hereafter exercising or claiming the right to engage in the business of piping, transporting or storing crude oil or petroleum, or any of the products thereof, or now or hereafter engaging in the business of buying, selling or dealing in crude oil or petroleum within the limits of this state…
It also grants the MPSC the power to define its own rules:
The commission is hereby authorized and empowered to make all rules, regulations, and orders, necessary to give effect to and enforce the provisions of this act.
Now, you will notice two things about these two sections of the act (for the record, they are sections 483.3 and 483.8): first, the MPSC is given pretty broad authority; they have the power to “control, investigate, and regulate” and can “make all rules, regulations, and orders” necessary to enforce the law. Secondly, you will notice that the three criteria stated in the MPSC press release are nowhere stated in Act 16 itself. Certainly, Act 16 does NOT limit the MPSC’s power to just those three items.
Why does this matter? Well, if you read through the MPSC filings, you will nevertheless see this three-part framework– public need, reasonable routing, and meeting current safety standards– again and again and again. In fact, Enbridge attorneys used this framework, successfully, to prevent all kinds of evidence and arguments from entering into the proceedings. They argued that these three things– and nothing else– are what the MPSC is charged with determining. Everything else, Enbridge argued, is “outside the scope of these proceedings.”
So where did they get this framework? It actually comes from a 2002 MPSC ruling in another pipeline application, the infamous Wolverine Pipe Line case (U-13225), which we’ve discussed before in a different context. This is what the Commission said in their order approving the Wolverine application:
Pursuant to 1929 PA 16, MCL 483.1 et seq., (Act 16) the Commission is granted the authority to control and regulate oil and petroleum pipelines. Act 16 provides the Commission with broad jurisdiction to approve the construction, maintenance, operation, and routing of pipelines delivering liquid petroleum products for public use. Generally, the Commission will grant an application pursuant to Act 16 when it finds that the applicant has demonstrated a public need for the proposed pipeline and that the proposed pipeline is designed and routed in a reasonable manner, which meets or exceeds current safety and engineering standards.
What happened is that Enbridge’s clever attorneys seized upon the last part of this statement (everything following “Generally”) and treated it as if it were clear, prescriptive, restrictive, binding law. They first floated this strategy– we haven’t been able to find such a claim in ANY case before the Commission prior to this– in an initial brief in December of 2011, during the phase one proceedings. There, Enbridge stated that:
In considering an Act 16 application, the Commission examines whether there is a need for the project and if the proposed pipeline is designed and routed in a reasonable manner, which meets or exceeds current safety and engineering standards.
And then, in a clever sleight of hand, they went on to cite the Wolverine language. They did NOT cite, it is crucial to note, anything from Act 16 itself. Rather, they simply presented the statement by the Commission in 2002 as if it were a statement defining and delimiting the Commission’s powers per se (as opposed to a statement that just sketches a rough set of guidelines).
But it is plainly not the case that this statement defines and delimits the Commission’s power or authority. For one thing, the Commission’s 2002 statement says that those three things are “generally” what they will consider. It does not say “exclusively” or “solely” or “only.” For another thing, Enbridge glosses over the earlier part of the statement, which mentions the Commission’s “broad jurisdiction.” And finally (to repeat) Act 16 itself absolutely does NOT limit the Commission to these three areas; there is no legal reason why the 2013 Commission in a completely different case should be bound or constrained by the rough– the GENERAL guidelines– set forth by the commissioners in an order in 2002.
Of course, none of this is particularly surprising or bothersome; it’s just crafty lawyers doing what crafty lawyers do. What’s bothersome is that ALJ Theresa Sheets, in an extraordinary display of credulity, swallowed this argument whole. In a Notice of Proposal for Decision filed in March of 2012 (in phase one), Judge Sheets reiterated Enbridge’s argument, citing the same statement from the Wolverine case. In fact, Sheets did Enbridge one better: first, she stated that in the 2002 case the MPSC “articulated the standard for approval of Act 16 applications.” Secondly, as if that way of putting it still weren’t restrictive enough, she then quotes the same language from the ruling– but leaves out the crucial word “generally.” Frankly, in such a carefully written document, this omission, in our view, can only be deliberate– designed further to give the 2002 MPSC statement binding authority. And indeed, Judge Sheets then goes on to use those three criteria as the test– the ONLY test– for approval of Enbridge’s application.
So, having convinced Judge Sheets of this narrow “standard” in phase one , Enbridge had no trouble returning to it repeatedly– and successfully– in phase two to prevent the intervenors from making their case. The question of local consent? Doesn’t fall under one of those three standards, so it’s outside the scope of the proceedings. The NTSB report? Doesn’t fall under one of those three standards, so it’s outside the scope of the proceedings. And so on. Of course, this narrow three-part standard is betrayed by all sorts of other things that were discussed in the proceedings, such as the matter of environmental impacts. Enbridge even had an expert witness who testified about environmental matters– a fact that just goes to show that the Commission DOES and SHOULD consider things other than standards articulated in the Wolverine case. The standard is really just in place when it serves Enbridge’s interest to invoke it.
More importantly, the insistence on a strict adherence to this standard– an adherence enforced by Judge Sheets– hamstrung everybody and prevented a complete and thorough hearing of the case– precisely what Enbridge wanted. And the worst part is that now that the standard has been invoked and endorsed (by Judge Sheets) and repeated and reiterated (in the MPSC press release, in news articles), it will surely take on even greater weight and authority; it will surely be cited in future cases before the MPSC and treated as settled law (even though it is not).
And in this way, Enbridge– a foreign corporation, mind you– has not only gotten its way in this particular case; it has also effectively rewritten Michigan law.
Thanks, Jeff. MI owes you big time.