Today, we officially launch our new series on our trip to Washington D.C. last week. As we noted the other day, the trip was a lobbying “fly-in” hosted by the National Wildlife Federation. We are very grateful to them for the opportunity– and not just because we had the chance to tell the story of Line 6B landowners to congressional staffers and officials at the State Department. We also got to meet all sorts of interesting, committed people from across the country (some of whom we’ll talk about a little during the course of this series).

We begin our series not with an account of one of our meetings, but with an account of a meeting we did NOT have. On the right is a picture of the FERC building. FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, is the agencey that regulates “the  transportation of oil by pipeline in interstate commerce” (among other things). Why a picture of FERC? Well, because we walked past it on our way from Union Station to the hotel. Also, we didn’t get a picture of the building that houses the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMSA), the agency responsible for regulating oil pipelines.

Why no picture of the PHMSA building? Well, because we didn’t get to see it. You see, the NWF requested a meeting with officials from PHMSA, but the agency declined to meet with any of us. Yes, you heard that right. PHMSA did not want to meet with an important national non-governmental organization, representatives from conservation groups from around the country, and ordinary citizens with a direct stake in pipeline safety. How’s that for responsive government?

This snub, positively Larry Springer-like, is all the more galling since action from PHMSA was one of the key “asks” of the fly-in (an “ask,” I learned, is lobbying jargon for the thing or things you are asking your government to do; hence, the purpose of your meeting with them). Back in May, the NWF, along with a coalition comprised of various other groups and individuals, submitted a petition to the EPA and PHMSA, asking for stricter regulations for tar sands pipelines to help ensure their safety. The measures called for in the petition are utterly reasonable; in fact, when you read them, your first reaction is that you can’t believe such standards and practices don’t already exist. For instance, the petition asks for “industry disclosure of products carried through pipelines and their conveyance schedules” (duh!); “stronger spill response plans” (of course!); “repair of pipelines as soon as defects are discovered” (obviously!); and “pipeline inspection and monitoring by independent entities unaffiliated with pipeline or energy companies” (wait, you mean they’re not independent now?!). These things all strike us utterly uncontroversial (except, perhaps, to to the most zealous of free-marketeering industry leave-us-aloners). You’d think that PHMSA, its reputation severely tarnished by the scathing NTSB report on Marshall, would jump at the chance to consider them. But you’d be wrong.

Which begs the question, why did PHMSA refuse this request for a meeting? Honestly, we have no idea. But we’re pretty sure it’s not because they’re so very busy working on other things related to tar sands pipeline safety. What leads us to such a conclusion? Well, let us tell you what PHMSA recently told Congress about its activities on this front:

First, the background. You might remember that in 2011, Congress passed the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, largely in response to the disaster in Marshall. It’s a pretty mealy-mouthed bill, in our view, but at least it was something. Mostly, it asks PHMSA– again, the federal regulatory agency responsible for pipeline safety– to take certain actions; well, to look into certain things. Among those things is this:

SEC. 16. STUDY OF TRANSPORTATION OF DILUTED BITUMEN.

Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall complete a comprehensive review of hazardous liquid pipeline facility regulations to determine whether the regulations are sufficient to regulate pipeline facilities used for the transportation of diluted bitumen. In conducting the review, the Secretary shall conduct an analysis of whether any increase in the risk of a release exists for pipeline facilities trans- porting diluted bitumen. The Secretary shall report the results of the review to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives.

The Act went into effect in January of 2012, which means that we are now past the 18 month point. Has PHMSA produced the “comprehensive review” Congress charged them with producing? No, they have not. They did commission the National Academy of Sciences to produce a review of existing studies of a very narrow topic, which was recently released (and touted by industry, but criticized by just about everyone else, including the Pipeline Safety Trust). But that’s it. A year and a half and PHMSA has failed to comply with what may be the most crucial component of the Act.

But that’s not the worst of it. If you really want to see PHMSA doing nothing, you have to take a look at the recent report they submitted to Congress in late June, which provides their response to a series of safety recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board in 2012. (PHMSA is required to submit these reports annually.) The NTSB issued a number of recommendations, the bulk of them in direct response to their findings in the Marshall investigation. PHMSA’s response, as reported to Congress, is mind boggling. It has to be one of the most extraordinary examples of foot-dragging, excuse-making, stalling, evading, and ass-covering we have ever seen– and that includes nearly two decades of paper deadline extension requests from feckless college students!

We’ll spare you the bulk of the details– it’s pretty dull, bureaucratic stuff– and just provide you with some highlights. The long and the short of it is that PHMSA has done almost nothing in response to the recommendations; they seem incapable of performing even the simplest and least onerous of tasks, and evidently don’t realize, or just don’t care, just how insulting to Congress, the NTSB, and the public their document makes them appear to be. We can’t decide if the report bespeaks PHMSA’s incompetence or its contempt toward Congress. Maybe it’s both.

Of the 10 recommendations issued by the NTSB, PHMSA has completed action on only one of them. In every other case, PHMSA simply says the such-and-such “is under development” or “is currently under development” or “is addressing this recommendation” or “is reviewing” the matter. In fact, if you’re looking for the ideal specimen of tortured, convoluted, obfuscating, shirking, hedging, responsibility-dodging, agency double-speak  you probably couldn’t do much better than PHMSA’s response to the recommendation that they “extend operator qualification requirements” for pipeline control center staff. What PHMSA says in response to that one– you should probably sit down for this– is that they are trying “to determine the best way to determine whether or not additional clarification is needed…”

No, we did not make that up.

But there’s more. For instance, the NTSB recommended that PHMSA issue an “advisory bulletin” to notify other pipeline operators “(1) of the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident, and (2) of the need to identify deficiencies in facility response plans,” updating them as necessary. Now, just so this is clear, keep in mind that an “advisory bulletin” is really just an informational document. It’s not rulemaking; it’s not fact-finding. It’s the equivalent of reminding your kids to wash their hands after they use the restroom. So has PHMSA issued this advisory bulletin– which really could consist of nothing more than a link to the NTSB report on Marshall along with a headnote that says, “DON’T DO THIS”? No, they have not. Instead, they say that the agency “anticipates publishing” such an advisory bulletin– a way of putting it that makes it seem like it’s out of their hands, like they’re farmers watching weather reports and expecting some much needed rain. A little later PHMSA says that the bulletin “is scheduled to be issued by August 2013.” Today is August 5, 2013. No bulletin has been issued.

The NTSB also recommended a second bulletin, one that describes the “deficiencies observed in Enbridge’s… integrity management program” so that other operators can eliminate similar deficiencies in their own operations. Again, this is a very simple task, the sort of thing that, say, Rebecca Craven of the PS Trust could probably type up during a coffee break on a busy day. In fact, almost anyone who has read the NTSB report could produce this bulletin. PHMSA has had a year to do it. But again, they only “anticipate” issuing a bulletin oft this sort– “by August 2013.” They’ve missed that deadline too.

So maybe all of this is why PHMSA didn’t want to meet with us last week. Maybe they’re ducking and hiding the way students who have not completed their assignments on time will sometimes avoid showing up for class because they know they’ll be called out. Maybe they know they’re asleep at the wheel and don’t want to face a bunch of people who also know it. Maybe they’re even a little ashamed and embarrassed.

Or maybe they’re just overworked and understaffed. In fact, we have no doubt that they’re understaffed. But if that’s the problem, why doesn’t their report reflect that serious problem? Why didn’t they just say to Congress, “You know, Congress, we recognize that this report makes us look hapless, but we are so understaffed and so poor in resources that we can’t even get a simple memo typed up when given a full year to do it, much less produce a comprehensive review of all of the implications of tar sands oil transport. These reports would be much more useful for everyone if you guys would appropriate some real resources to us”? But PHMSA says nothing of the sort. And the fact that it doesn’t say so leads us to believe that this isn’t exactly the problem.

So maybe it’s something else. Maybe they just don’t want to do these things. Maybe they’d prefer not to institute any new regulations or stricter requirements. Maybe they don’t want to rehearse the parade of horrors that was the Marshall spill because they don’t want to make Enbridge look bad all over again. Maybe they are so cozy with industry and so hostile to organizations like the NWF and people like us that they drag their feet on Congressional mandates and NTSB recommendations and they duck and hide from critics and the members of the public they are supposed to protect because that’s better for industry. Because that’s who they’re really working for.

Of course, we don’t really know whether any of that’s actually the case. This is all just speculation on our part. But we have no choice but to speculate because PHMSA, when offered the chance to sit down and talk with us in good faith to explain all of this for itself, just shut the door  in our face, rather than face some hard questions and listen to some legitimate citizen concerns.

Around here, we’ve got a name for that sort of avoidance, for the strategy of avoiding, as much as you can,  communications with your critics, evading tough questions, pretending like the unhappiness and dissatisfaction isn’t happening and maybe after a while it will all just go away: we call that an Enbridge Special.