We’re back from a nice weekend break from Enbridge-related matters. Hopefully, you also enjoyed some of the nice autumn weather. We’ve got more reports on the PS Trust conference coming— most notably, an account of the terrific environmental panel with Beth Wallace, Anthony Swift, and Gabe Scott. Stay tuned for that. We also have another Enbridge newspaper ad to respond to as well.
In the meantime, we’re perusing the colorful, glossy newsletter from Enbridge that we received in the mail recently. Presumably, many of you received it also. As far as Enbridge communications go, it’s not half-bad (which isn’t saying much), although we can’t help but wonder where this devotion to communicating with the public was back when Phase 1 of the project kicked off. We didn’t receive any glossy newsletters back in February (or March, April, May, June, July, or August) when we were first contacted by a ROW agent. We also weren’t notified of any open houses in our area of the sort Thomas Hodge says Enbridge held last summer:
Enbridge conducted four open houses on this project [Phase 2] in June 2012. Thank you to the nearly 300 people who attended these open houses. Attendees were able to meet with project staff to ask questions, view detailed project maps and provide input.
All of that sounds great. It’s a shame, however, that all four of those open houses were held in a very small area near Kalamazoo and in Indiana. Over here on the east side (and all along the Phase 1 route), no such open houses were held. We haven’t a clue as to why not.
The open house story is not the only part of the newsletter that paints a misleading picture of Enbridge’s public awareness campaign. On the back page of the brochure, there is this very curious paragraph under the heading “Local Residents Offer Feedback on Enbridge Communications”:
This past September, Enbridge conducted focus groups in several communities in Michigan and Indiana. Faocus groups consist of a guided discussion led by a moderator and designed to be casual and interactive. In total, we met with more than 120 people who live and/or work near our pipelines and who shared their thoughts and feedback about us and our operations. We hald these meetings for the primary purposes of developing better communications and building stronger relationships with the communities in which we operate. The results from the focus groups will help guide our future communications and outreach activity as the projects move through the planning, regulatory and construction phases.
This is very curious indeed. For one thing, 120 people strikes us an extremely small sample given the scope of the project. For another, we don’t recall an invitation to participate in any “focus group”– though we have a vague recollection of a mysterious call inviting us to some kind of energy-related meeting. At the time, we though it was a marketing scam, since the caller could not give us any specific details. Was this the Enbridge focus group? If so, it’s a very poor way to gather honest input from affected landowners– though not surprising, coming from Enbridge. Instead of soliciting landowner feedback directly, this would suggest that they just hired some market research firm. But if they really wanted to hear about the experiences of affected stakeholders wouldn’t it have been better (and not very difficult) just to call all of us? Invite us all to fill out some kind of survey? Of course, that might elicit real feedback, not the carefully-controlled, p.r. driven, market research-style input that Enbridge would prefer to generate. As we’ve noted time and again, when it comes to serious, honest, pull-no-punches comments from landowners, Enbridge just doesn’t want to hear it.
One last item in the newsletter worth commenting upon: on a page describing “High Safety Standards for All Enbridge Projects,” we are provided these two intriguing bullet points (among others):
- The new pipeline segments will contain more remotely-operated isolation valves than what is required by federal regulations.
- The new pipeline segments will be internally inspected more frequently than U.S. regulatory requirements, using state of the art in-line inspection technology.
Our regular readers might recall that we have asked questions seeking clarification about this matter of exceeding federal regulatory requirements on numerous occasions. We asked about it directly at the Brandon Township workshop, for instance. More recently, we wrote to Enbridge’s Terri Larson asking her which specific features of the design exceed which regulatory requirements. Enbridge reps couldn’t answer that question at the workshop– and more than two months later they still haven’t answered it. As for Terri Larson, it’s been more than a week now and she still hasn’t gotten us an answer. Now, to be clear: we do not think this is Terri’s fault; we believe her when she tells us she is looking into it. The problem appears to be that the information just isn’t very easy to obtain. But if the claim is true, why should it be so hard to answer such a simple question?
As we await more information from Terri on this, we are also looking into the specific claims cited above (about isolation valves and inspections)– but that involves doing a bit of research into federal regulations– ugh! But once we’ve got some answers, we will pursue this matter in more detail.
As we were reading the glossy paged newsletter we saw no mention of any additional supervision of and training for their employees to prevent another disaster being amplfied by human error. While we are glad to know that Enbridge intends to comply with federal legislation, the regulations regarding tar sands oil pipelines have yet to be enacted. The unique dangers this product poses is still being studied.
Would love to hear your comment on the last Free Press ad by Enbridge (happy landowner)
Working on it, Linda! Excellent point, Donna!
The claim of “exceeding federal regulatory requirements” was put out by TransCanada’s Keystone XL, so, someone took their list of 57 “improvements” for their pipeline to task. It turned out that particular list was mostly just restating of existing rules they would follow!
Now, for the 2 “standards” mentioned above:
The new pipeline segments will contain more remotely-operated isolation valves than what is required by federal regulations.
Richard Kuprewicz has mentioned before this can be an illusion. Some pipelines have used adding remote operated valves on a pipeline above PHMSA rules as justification for routing pipelines in very sensitive to pipeline failure locations. There’s also that matter of shutting down the pipeline quickly if they suspect a leak, again. Note that other pipelines have also failed to respond to alarms suggesting a leak.
The new pipeline segments will be internally inspected more frequently than U.S. regulatory requirements, using state of the art in-line inspection technology.
The PHMSA Integrity Management program requires pipeline reassessment (retesting) every 7 years. But, it would be crazy on a pipeline that can run Internal Line Inspection (ILI) tools (smart pigs) to wait for the full 7 years. ILI tool technology is constantly improving, so running new generation smart pigs is very wise when they come out to find latent flaws, “yahoo with a backhoe” can hit a pipeline without rupturing it, but, not report that they damaged it, soil can settle (cracks and distortion of the pipe), and corrosion does not sleep.
Then, once there’s an indication of an issue, will pipeline anomalies be checked out quickly? This is one of the big mysteries of the Marshall MI Enbridge failure, for they had hundreds of anomalies detected that were classified in the 18 month required to check out category, but were put of for some reason. I have yet to have an explanation as to why they didn’t check those anomalies.