This week we kicked off our new series on the MPSC hearings of Phase Two of the Line 6B project. Among other things, we’re using this series as an occasion to explore the regulatory function and performance– weak and ineffectual, in our view– of the Public Service Commission. In our first installment, we introduced you to the MPSC’s public engineer Travis Warner. In this our second installment, we will introduce you to another MPSC employee. But first, a final thought about the MPSC’s public engineer:

Our intent was not to pick on young Mr. Warner. We understand that he’s simply part of a system that appears to actively discourage the slightest skepticism or tough questioning toward companies like Enbridge. For instance, we are more than a little nonplussed by just how thin Warner’s analysis of Enbridge’s application really is. After all, the MPSC relies heavily on Warner’s testimony about such matters as whether the proposed pipeline meets or exceeds current safety and engineering standards. Yet consider this exchange during his testimony (the questioner is attorney Gary Field):

Q: For a petroleum pipeline project, what standards do you review?

A: What standards do I review?

Q: Yes.

A: Well, Michigan doesn’t have standards for petroleum pipelines. It would be the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration Standards.

Q: Do you review those standards?

A: Very generally. I’m not extremely familiar with them.

Similarly, consider his response to a question about whether the existing Line 6B could be sufficiently repaired: “I relied on Enbridge’s opinion on that matter.” Or a question about how much additional capacity (or petroleum) is appropriate for Line 6B: “I relied on Enbridge’s opinion on that matter.”

Yes, this is your “Public Service” agency at work. In this matter, they appear only to be serving the interests of Enbridge, not the public. Which brings us to Travis Warner’s colleague, MPSC staff counsel Assistant Attorney General Michael J. Orris. To be honest, we don’t really understand what, exactly, Orris’s role entails. What we do know, however, is that virtually everything he has said or done during the course of the proceedings has been for the direct benefit of Enbridge.

For example, on the day of cross-examinations of witnesses (November 13, 2012), all four of Enbridge’s witnesses– Mark Sitek, Tom Hodge, Enbridge Environmental Analyst Rachel Shetka, and our old pal Doug Aller— appeared for questioning by Gary Field (on behalf of the intervenors) and Steven Fischer (representing himself). One would think, in such a proceeding, that the attorney hired to advocate on behalf of the public (the MPSC is, after all, a public agency) would at least have a few questions for the applicants (Enbridge). Yet Orris had not a single question for Sitek, Shetka, or Aller. He did ask Tom Hodge a brief question, the purport of which is not altogether clear, regarding route variations. But other than that, he was idle.

But not entirely idle. Orris had plenty of objections to make during Fields’s cross-examinations. In fact, on one point, Orris was quite tenacious. You see, while questioning Tom Hodge, Field dared to mention the NTSB report on the Marshall spill. When he did, Enbridge attorney Michael Ashton immediately objected and Orris was only too happy to weigh in in support of Ashton’s position.

Now, bear with us for a moment. To understand what happened at this point in the proceedings requires a bit of context–and, we’re sorry to say, some legalistic nitpicking. You might remember that way back in July, the intervenors in Phase Two requested a delay in order to review the NTSB report. Enbridge, not surprisingly, argued that the report was not relevant to these proceedings (an extraordinary argument to make, in our view). The delay was granted (in part) in order to give the intervenors time to review the report, even though Administrative Law Judge Theresa Sheets also stated that the NTSB report “is not admissible in these hearings under federal statute.”

It’s this last statement that is the sticking point. The federal statute to which Sheets refers is federal code 49 U.S. C., section 1154, which states:

No part of a report of the Board, related to an accident or an investigation of an accident, may be admitted into evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.

Now, on the face of it, this legal provision makes good sense. After all, if a report like the NTSB’s report on Marshall could be used in a civil lawsuit, then those who work for a company likely to be sued (like Enbridge) would be reluctant to speak freely to investigators; doing so might well cost their company a lot of money. The question, however, is whether the same sort of idea applies to other sorts of proceedings, like applications before the MPSC.

Or to put this another way, the  question comes down to what, precisely, the sentence in the federal law actually says–because it’s not quite as straightforward as it at first appears. Does that sentence say (a) that a report cannot be admitted into evidence (period); nor can a report be used in a civil action? Or does it say (b) that, when it comes to a civil action for damages, a report cannot be either admitted into evidence or used? See the difference? Obviously, Enbridge argues for “a”– as Gary Field nicely puts it at the hearing, “Mr. Ashton wants to put a period after the first verb”– and the intervenors argue for “b.”

For her part, Judge Sheets says that she does “acknowledge that the language of the statute can be interpreted in two ways.” Yet she also says  that she interprets the language “very similarly to the manner in which Enbridge” interprets it. “I think that the language, while it may be a little unclear, I think that that’s the intent,” she says. (Upon what basis she determines this “intent,” however, she does not bother to say.)

But here’s the thing (and this will bring us back to Michael Orris): it’s obvious why Enbridge attorneys favor interpretation A just as it’s obvious why the intervenors’ attorney favors interpretation B. Both of those parties are, by definition, partial. But what about the MPSC attorney? He represents neither the party seeking approval (Enbridge) nor the party seeking to deny approval (the intervenors)? Rather, he represents only the MPSC, whose only interest, presumably, is the collective interest of the citizens of the state of Michigan. What, therefore, would one expect his position to be?

We can think of a couple of possibilities: (1) he could take no position at all, but choose to remain neutral and leave it to the Judge to decide. That would be understandable. Or (2) he could acknowledge the ambiguity in the federal statute (and it is unquestionably ambiguous) and choose simply to err on the side of caution. In this case, erring on the side of caution would almost certainly mean allowing the report into evidence. After all, how can anyone argue that considering MORE information, rather than less– especially when it is information pertaining to the very pipeline that Enbridge is seeking to replace– is bad for the public interest? If the “replacement” of Line 6B really does satisfy the three standards upon which the MPSC must make its decision, it ought to be able to satisfy those standards even in the face of MPSC scrutiny of a factual report released by a federal agency. Right?

Well, no. Following Ashton’s objection to any discussion of the NTSB report, Judge Sheets asks, “any comment by Staff (meaning Orris)?” And here is a part of Orris’s semi-coherent reply:

This report, statute controls whether this report comes in, not what it says on the cover sheet of this report. The statute is a controlling language. I do not think that this report is evidence, can be admitted as evidence in this proceeding. The orders themselves speak for themselves of what Enbridge is going to do to operate the line. This is just background information telling the National Transportation Safety Board and telling the Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, who formed the basis for it, but the correction, the corrective action orders are themselves what Enbridge is going to do, not the content here. What Enbridge did in the control room there has nothing to do with Public Act 16 of 1929.

Apparently, even Judge Sheets found this convoluted reply a little unclear because she then asks, “So you think there’s a relevancy issue here as well?” To which Orris responds, “Yes. Yes, I do. I think the statute quite clearly states that this is not evidence, it’s not relevant to the proceeding.” Now obviously, Michael Orris is entitled to his professional legal opinion on a matter of dispute such as this one– and that opinion does not always have to be the same as ours. But to suggest that the language of the statue “quite clearly states” anything (the lack of clarity in the language is the whole reason there is a dispute in the first place!) is just plain disingenuous. At best, it’s a judgment call.

But because of Orris’s argument, siding with Enbridge (at least in part), Sheets decides to sustain the Enbridge objection, which she says, “was essentially seconded by Staff,” and she rules that the report “will not be admissible in these proceedings.”

And this is precisely the problem– with Orris, with Warner, with the MPSC itself: “Staff” invariably “essentially seconds” the view of Enbridge. Orris neither questions nor challenges anything Enbridge witnesses say, for example, but repeatedly objects to Gary Fields’ questions during cross-examination of Travis Warner. And like his view on the admissibility of the NTSB report, those objections almost always have to do with narrowing and limiting the scope of the proceedings; they involve the exclusion, rather than the inclusion of information or comment. It’s as if Orris views his job as ensuring that the MPSC permits the hearing of as little evidence as possible, ensuring that it takes the narrowest, most limited view possible of its regulatory function.

Of course, this is exactly the strategy employed by Enbridge, both inside and outside the MPSC: the less discussion, the better; the less scrutiny, the better; the less the public knows, the better. It’s easy to understand why Enbridge would take this view: they don’t always look so good in the bright light of the facts. But why those who are supposed to work on behalf of the public interest (not Enbridge’s interest), those whose salaries we pay, would take the same view as Enbridge is more than just baffling; it’s betrayal.